The haze episodes of 1997 and 1998 and the apparent beginnings of another one this year have shown very vividly to us the close links among ASEAN, media and the environment - among them all together and between one and each of the other two.

The media, of course, are very important to ASEAN. Public perceptions of ASEAN are determined to a large extent by the media. In the light of the increasing importance of regional markets in investment decisions, such perceptions, in turn, heavily influence investment flows and other capital flows, as well as tourism. The recent financial crisis and the haze episodes, which happened at about the same time, made starkly clear the extent to which this is so. Public perceptions within Southeast Asia also determine to a significant extent the degree of political support for ASEAN and the concept of regionalism.

In few areas of human concern are the work of public information - and thus the role of the media -- more important than the protection of the environment. In few areas of Southeast Asian concern is ASEAN cooperation more critical than the protection of Southeast Asia's environment in the air and in the sea.

I need not stress here that the protection of the environment is the responsibility of everyone - governments -- national, provincial and local -- communities, non-governmental organizations, political parties, businesses, families, and individuals. The media are needed to sharpen the awareness of people, communities, political forces and governments of the close connection between the state of the environment and people's lives and livelihoods. The media are needed to marshal public pressure and the political will to protect the environment as vital to the wellbeing of people, of society and of the country. The media are needed to impress upon the people and their communities that the political fates of their national and local leaders ought to depend to an important degree on what they do about preserving the environment.

I have been appalled, for example, by the reluctance of personalities in leadership positions, and of the media, to highlight sharply enough the close link between massive floods and drought and the destruction of watersheds and forests. I have been struck by the failure of the media and the public to press for the punishment of those responsible for the destruction and the resulting floods and drought - and haze. Media and public pressure is needed for the adoption and enforcement of measures to prevent such disasters in the future.

The haze that is threatening Southeast Asia again is a prime example of a situation in which media and public pressure, as well as regional cooperation, is essential.

At the height of the haze episodes, the media and others asked: What has ASEAN done about the haze? The answer to this question was made a test of ASEAN's effectiveness as an association. The haze problem was held up as an example of actions in one country heavily affecting the people in neighboring countries. It was cited as an instance of regional action made necessary by a regional problem even if it involves a country's "internal affairs."

The media and other commentators are right in asking such questions and putting ASEAN to the test on this basis.

The difficulty of precisely quantifying the losses inflicted by the land and forest fires has resulted in widely varying estimates. However, one set of estimates, probably a conservative one, gives an idea of the magnitude of the damage. The World Wildlife Fund and the Economy and Environment Programme for Southeast Asia released in May 1998 an updated study of the impact of the 1997 haze episode. According to this study, Indonesia alone lost almost US$500 million in timber, US$470 million in agriculture, US$700 million in direct forest benefits, more than US$1 billion in indirect forest benefits, and US$30 million in "capturable biodiversity."

Indonesia and other countries suffered a total of US$940 million in short-term health costs, with Indonesia accounting for US$924 million of this. Tourism was set back in neighboring countries by US$186 million and in Indonesia by US$70 million. There were other costs as well. The WWF-EEPSEA study places the total cost at US$3.8 billion for Indonesia and US$700 for its neighbors. This does not include long-term health damage, the cost of interrupted schooling, and so on.

If the haze has such an impact on people's lives across national boundaries, clearly regional cooperation is urgently required. If there is any problem that is transnational in scope and therefore calls for transnational or regional action, it is the transboundary pollution of the environment, whether of the air or of the sea.

Faced with the threat that the haze poses to the people and the economies of the region, and not just the country of its source, and confronted with this test of regional responsiveness, what has ASEAN done about it?

In response to the 1997 haze episode, the Regional Haze Action Plan was worked out by ASEAN's Haze Technical Task Force, which had been established in 1995 by the ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment. The action plan was endorsed by the first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze in late 1997. The ministerial meeting is a forum specially set up to deal with this urgent problem. It has been convened eight times in the two years of its existence.

The Regional Haze Action Plan prescribes concrete measures to be carried out by specific parties at the regional, sub-regional and national levels to prevent and monitor the haze and mitigate its impact. National haze action plans have been developed to complement it. It is on the basis of these plans that ASEAN and the member-states concerned have taken action on the haze problem. At the same time, Indonesia and Malaysia entered into a bilateral agreement to cooperate in dealing with it.

Early in 1998, sub-regional fire-fighting arrangements were set up - one in Sumatra and the other in Borneo. A special unit, supported by the Asian Development Bank, was installed at the ASEAN Secretariat as the institutional framework for monitoring the implementation of the Regional Haze Action Plan and mobilizing resources from the international community for this purpose. Detailed implementation plans for regional, sub-regional and national efforts were drawn up. Training and dry runs have been carried out. The exchange of information has intensified. The ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Centre in Singapore has supplied valuable satellite data, pinpointing the location and extent of fires and "hot spots."

In April this year, the sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze adopted the zero-burning policy. Since then, strict enforcement by Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia of the zero-burning policy, together with the presumption provisions in their laws, has helped to control burning in their territories. Malaysia has offered to conduct training courses on zero-burning practices in Sumatra and Kalimantan, particularly for plantation companies. Last month, the Indonesian government held dialogues among forest concessionaires, plantation companies and government officials to promote zero burning. It is now working on legislation and other regulatory measures to carry out the zero-burning policy.

At their meeting two weeks ago, the ASEAN ministers decided to meet personally with Indonesian and Malaysian plantation companies to urge them to employ more acceptable practices in land development. They encouraged Indonesia to hold more dialogues with such companies and with forest concessionaires. They called for joint visits by member-countries to observe the execution of such national measures as enforcement, fire-fighting, and the prosecution of offenders. The ministers endorsed the terms of reference for the development of an ASEAN legal framework on transboundary haze pollution.

Despite the skepticism of many, ASEAN members have shown, in the case of the haze, a capacity and willingness to speak frankly and give encouragement to one another. This, even in a matter that involves what some might regard as the internal affairs of one or more members. This is because the haze is not a matter that is entirely internal to an individual member, as it has had an immense impact on others.

Has ASEAN action been effective? Only a reduction in the incidence and magnitude of the haze in the future will tell.

In any case, the evolving system and practice of mutual encouragement and assistance at the regional level is important because of the reinforcement that it gives to those forces in the country concerned - in Indonesia, in this case -- that are fighting the haze and its causes. Arrayed against these forces are the equally or more powerful pressures on behalf of the profits, the exports and the government revenue to be derived from the conversion of forests into plantations by the relatively cheap method of igniting land and forest fires. Counter-pressures on an ASEAN scale are helpful to those elements in the government, in society and in the community that care about the protection of the environment and support sustainable ways of development.

ASEAN cooperation encourages interest and assistance from the international community. ASEAN has to mobilize its own resources for cooperative action against the haze and its causes. But it cannot deal with this problem by itself. It needs the technology, the equipment, the training and the financing that can come only from the developed countries and from international institutions. For example, Canada spends an estimated C$500 million every year to suppress forest fires. Still, some ten thousand fires burn annually over an area of about two and a half million hectares in Canada.

The international community, too, has its responsibility for helping to monitor, prevent and fight the land and forest fires in Southeast Asia. It has this interest in terms of the damage that the fires inflict on the biodiversity of our planet and the potential that they have for climate change.

Aside from the critical support from the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, Australia, Canada, the European Union, Germany, Japan, the United States and others have extended assistance, in varying magnitudes, to ASEAN's and Indonesia's efforts to control the burning of forests and cushion its impact. This assistance has come in the form of training, technical help, equipment, and financial support. The ASEAN Secretariat is coordinating much of this assistance.

Clearly, all have their roles and their responsibilities - national and local governments, communities and society, individual citizens, non-governmental organizations, ASEAN, the international community, and the media.

The media, certainly. The media ought to keep the spotlight on this problem, not only when the haze darkens the sky, but also when fires are lighted and when governments and communities and regional and international organizations slacken their efforts. And also when solutions are being worked out and progress is being made.

The media might help to rally community and citizen participation in the care of the environment and apportion credit for its protection and blame for its destruction. They could increase their contribution by recognizing progress and encouraging achievement. In the case of the haze, the media should also acknowledge the complexity of the problem.

The media, of course, are expected to be meticulous about the facts and to keep abreast of them. Many facts about ASEAN, including ASEAN's work on the environment, are available at www.aseansec.org, which has a special site called ASEAN Haze Action Online.